[45 ]“Notes on Nullification.” Writings, IX, 600. He had expertly maneuvered a bill of rights through the House without having to make concessions to the states’ rights partisans—concessions that would have severely weakened the national government. James Madison, Fourth President of the United States. Despite the ambiguities and difficulties associated with Madison’s position in The Federalist —as well as with Hamilton’s, for that matter—a convincing case can be made that, from the early 1780s until shortly after the commencement of the system he helped to fashion, Madison was an energetic proponent of a strong national government. Moreover, even after this initial change, he was not entirely consistent in his outlook or in his answers to very important questions inherent in his conception of federalism. While, he writes, “the existing Confederation is founded on principles which are fallacious” —so much so that it must be abandoned— “other confederacies which could be consulted as precedents, have been vitiated by the same erroneous principles.” As a result, he observes, the history of confederacies “furnish[es] no other light than that of beacons, which give warning of the course to be shunned, without pointing out that which ought to be pursued” (37:182). [35 ]John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland puts this matter quite lucidly in rejecting the Maryland contention that the Constitution is a compact between the states. The Federalist Party was the first political party in the United States.Under Alexander Hamilton, it dominated the national government from 1789 to 1801.It became a minority party while keeping its stronghold in New England and made a brief resurgence by opposing the War of 1812.. But the chief difficulty with Madison’s position concerns, once again, the relationship between the Court and the people operating in their political capacities through the elective departments of the national government. Although James Madison is best known for the views he expressed in the Federalist, as he gained greater experience in the new American political system he rejected some of these early views and increasingly emphasized four propositions: (1) the greatest threat in the American republic comes from a minority, not the majority; (2) to protect their rights from minority factions, … What but the highest political authority, could make such a Constitution?” He answers that the “sovereignty” that created such a Constitution “resides not in a single state but in the people of each of the several states, uniting with those of the others in the express and solemn compact which forms the Constitution.” 38 Nor, in this connection, could Madison entertain the proposition implicit in nullification, namely, “that ... every party to a compact, has a right to take for granted, that its construction is the infallible one, and to act upon it against the construction of all others, having an equal right to expound the instrument, nay against the regular exposition of the constituted authorities, with the tacit sanction of the community.” This “doctrine” he termed “subversive of all constitutions, all laws, and all compacts.” 39 What is more, from his vantage point, the proponents of nullification were forced to deny reality to support their position; that is, they had to look upon the Constitution as “a treaty, a league, or at most a confederacy among nations, as independent and sovereign, in relation to each other, as before the charter which calls itself a Constitution was formed.” 40, Despite this, we must note, Madison did not deny the right of a state to rebel against national authority. He was indeed a federalist. It seems so odd since he distrusted the Supreme Court and thought it was only necessary for the court to render legal remedies in a last resort situation when a legislature could not. At first blush this would suggest that the Constitution is a compact between sovereign and equal states very much along the lines of the Articles. Certain of his points in this respect are noteworthy in light of his later thoughts concerning state-national relations. foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyranny at home.” … Lacking any power to imposes taxes or raise troops directly, it was obliged to “requisition” (i.e. His Virginia Plan furnished the basic framework and guiding principles of the Constitution. While he is widely hailed as the “father” of the Philadelphia Constitution, we find that he was, almost from the outset of its operations, schizophrenic about the nature of the political union it fashioned. Still, Madison hinted (and perhaps hoped) that the people’s allegiance would shift if Congress displayed “manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration.”[9] Finally, they urged that the state militias supplied a reliable check on federal tyranny inasmuch as they would outnumber and outmatch any possible federal army.[10]. The presentation is a version of his essay from "James Madison: Memory, Service, and Fame" (1999). However, this “narrow” approach, though at first glance theoretically more attractive than that of the nationalists, on further examination gives rise to problems and concerns that were never satisfactorily resolved in The Federalist and still remain very much with us today. Extensiveness, he notes, also requires “the delegation of the government ... to a small number of citizens elected by the rest” (10:46). Jonathan Elliot, 5 vols. Consequently, he seems keen on refuting any such reading: “For what purpose,” he asks, “could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power?” By way of answering, he remarks, “Nothing is more natural or common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars.” Thus, he contends, the particulars or enumerated powers can be exercised in accordance with the goals or intent expressed in the “general phrase” (41:215). Writing just days after Massachusetts became , Madison brings together his previous work on Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances to demonstrate how the Constitution is the best republican government for the United States as it stood during the late 18th century. At one point, to give, as he put it, “full force” to the arguments against a national government such as that envisioned in the Virginia Plan, he asks his fellow delegates to speculate on the consequences of giving an “indefinite power ... to the General Legislature” thereby reducing the “States ... to corporations dependent on the General Legislature.” Reasoning in a manner consonant with the views he had expressed earlier to Washington, he saw no reason why under this arrangement the legislature would deprive the states of any power so long as its continued exercise by the states was either desired by the people or “beneficial.” He points to the examples of the states, particularly Connecticut, where “all the Townships are incorporated, and have a certain limited jurisdiction” and asks rhetorically: “have the Representatives or the people of the Townships in the Legislature ever endeavored to despoil the Townships of any part of their local authority?” He concludes that this has not been the case insofar as “this local authority is convenient to the people.” And he sees no reason why this same relationship or condition should not obtain between the states and a national government vested with indefinite powers: “As far as its [national government] operation would be practicable it could not in this view be improper; as far as it would be impracticable, the conveniency of the General Government itself would concur with that of the people in the maintenance of subordinate Governments.” Beyond this, he did not believe that “the people would ... be less free, as members of one great Republic, than as members of thirteen small ones.” Thus, even “supposing a tendency in the General Government to absorb the State Governments no fatal consequences could result.” However, state encroachments on national authority, he felt, would have fatal consequences; a judgment he believed was borne out by “the experiment we are now making to prevent the calamity.” 12. 10 From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Federalist No. From the New York Packet. Author: James Madison (Publius) January 29, 1788. This chief neither directed nor suggested Madison’s opposition to Hamilton’s consolidation policy, but his political conduct was now influenced by Jefferson’s stronger personality and extraordinary power of attracting men to him.” 27, Irving Brant offers a more principled explanation of Madison’s behavior. In short, a wholistic view indicates the consistency of Madison’s actions and words regarding federalism. Madison informs us, consistent with his Federalist views, that the political departments of the national government will rarely intrude upon the residual powers of the states. In his view, Madison must be regarded as “a working statesman” who sought to achieve an “effective balance among the actual and shifting forces of American politics.” Consequently, when he perceived that “the concentration of power in the national government appeared to threaten freedom, corrupt government, or drive substantial parties or sections to despair, he would organize countervailing powers and emphasize anticentralist, libertarian principles.” Conversely, when the centrifugal force of local interests or presumed minority rights threatened needed and effective national authority, “Madison would throw his weight to the center and emphasize the principle of majority rule.” According to Meyers, Madison’s chief objective in this rather flexible policy “was the perfection of a lasting American republic.” 30. [30 ]Marvin Myers, The Mind of the Founder: James Madison (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1982), xiii. In saying this, we recognize that another view or interpretation of Madison’s position is arguable; namely, he meant for the boundaries to be set by the Court over time, not through the consensual processes described above. But—and this brings us back to reflect on the central element of the new constitutional morality—this agency need not be the Supreme Court, as the revisionists would have it. To this point he wrote: “How much has the national dignity, interest, and revenue suffered from this cause? to date; Chicago, 1962——). Nevertheless, we may look upon this approach as an excellent tactic on Madison’s part because, while his views might be disputed, they could never be controverted. 10 created by James Madison explains the strong factual points that hold values within the Constitution in establishing a government that protects the people. And, if this be the case, is it not “legitimate” for one’s views of state-national powers to vary according to the issues at stake in any particular controversy? To be sure, they take on an added complexity, but in the last analysis they come down to a search for a suitable procedure or process for settling controversies within his system of divided sovereignty. It would seem that, on the basis of what Madison writes in this regard, we have good reason to presume such a consensus if the political parties have held the same constitutional construction for a “reasonable” period of time. Can we reconcile the “nationalist” Madison and the “localist” Madison? And we can readily imagine the national government intruding upon the states’ domain, and legitimately so, to defend the Union against foreign attack. Years later, Madison noted that, while both levels of governments had attempted unconstitutional power-grabs, recent “theoretical innovations at least are putting new weights into the scale of federal sovereignty,” upsetting the balance in that direction. Federalist No. Which decision, that of the common constituents expressed over time or that of the Court, would he have accepted as authoritative? that the national Legislature ought to be impowered to … legislate in cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the general harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation. For this reason, the question whether the Court’s opinion should take precedence over this developed consensus is not easy to answer. The heroes for these revisionists were the early Republicans led by Jefferson who played upon and emphasized the centrifugal aspects of the tradition. [18 ]William W. Crosskey did look upon The Federalist in such a fashion. James Madison published his essays using the name ‘Publius’. Author: James Madison (Publius) January 19, 1788. To secure “the rights and powers of the States in their individual capacities, against an undue preponderance of the powers granted to the government over them in their united capacity, the Constitution has relied on, (1) the responsibility of the Senators and Representatives in the Legislature of the U.S. to the Legislatures and people of the states; (2) the responsibility of the President to the people of the U.S.; and (3) the liability of the Executive and Judicial functionaries of the U.S. to impeachment by the Representatives of the people of the States, in one branch of the Legislature ... and trial by the Representatives of the States, in the other branch.” While conceding that “time alone” will determine whether “this structure of Government” will operate to preserve the legitimate rights and powers of the states, he feels that thus far (1830) “sufficient control, in the popular will,” has been exercised over the “Executive and Legislative Departments.” Such, he notes, was the case with the Alien and Sedition Laws when “the first election that ensued after their passage put an end to them.” Moreover, in his opinion, “whatever may have been the character of the other acts, in the judgment of many of us, it is but true, that they have generally accorded with the view of a majority of the States and of the people.” 72, Turning specifically to the Supreme Court in this context, he maintains that the “thirty-ninth number of The Federalist ” embodies both the “prevailing view” at the time of founding and the “view that has continued to prevail” concerning the settlement of controversies between the national and state governments: namely, the Supreme Court is “the tribunal which is ultimately to decide.” He is quick to add this “concession of ... power to the Supreme Court, in cases falling within the course of its functions ... has not always been rightly exercised.” But, though the courts have on occasion rendered decisions “which have incurred serious and extensive disapprobation,” Madison still gives the judiciary and, presumably, the Supreme Court, high marks: “with but few exceptions, the course of the Judiciary has been hitherto sustained by the predominant sense of the nation.” 73, In this context Madison was not so much concerned with the Court setting forth general principles or standards for determining state-national boundaries or restraining the national government, as with the capacity of the national government to enforce its laws uniformly among the states. That Madison’s solutions today are regarded as nothing less than heretical in some quarters—a fact that helps to account for the helplessness of the political arms to restrict or otherwise control the Court—indicates the extent to which the Constitution, its character and operations, is now conceived of in terms totally foreign to Madison’s. Alexander Hamilton and the American Revolution I, Alexander Hamilton and the American Revolution II, American Political Sermons: A Bibliography, American Political Writing during the Founding 1760-1805, Colonial Origins of the American Constitution, Farrand on the Federal Convention of 1787, Federalist: An Introduction by Carey and McClellan, Forrest McDonald, “The Founding Fathers and the Economic Order”, James Wilson and the American Constitution, Jefferson: An Introduction to his Writings, Madison’s Notes: Analytical Index (Elliot ed. Consonant with his more general republican theory, he writes that “it is not probable that the Supreme Court would long be indulged in a career of usurpation opposed to the decided opinions and policy of the Legislature.” Nor did he believe “Congress, seconded by Judicial Power” could, “without some change in the character of the nation, succeed in durable violations of the rights and authorities of the States.” “But, what,” he asks, “is to control Congress when backed and even pushed on by a majority of their Constituents?” His answer: “Nothing within the pale of the Constitution but sound arguments and conciliatory expostulation addressed both to Congress and to their Constituents.” 77. [76 ]Letter to Edward Everett, August 28, 1830. He was instrumental in the drafting of the Constitution, and became a Federalist for this reason. Writings, IX, 600–601. A correspondence would be opened. [19 ]On Madison’s interpretation of the “necessary and proper” clause set forth in Federalist 44, David Epstein notes: “He [Madison] treats ‘necessary and proper’ as if it meant necessary or proper, i.e., as if Congress may make all laws which shall be necessary and all laws which shall be proper—rather than only those laws which are both .... That is, the permitted category includes all necessary and all proper laws, and excludes only those which are neither.” The Political Theory of “The Federalist” (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 44. If so, then even his “nationalist” views on federalism actually display concern for mutual contestation, while also reflecting the unique circumstances of ratification, which dictated a strengthening of federal power. In the first place, as we shall see, Madison’s conception of federalism changed significantly soon after the new Constitution began to operate. vivia6elerbhr vivia6elerbhr 03/13/2017 History High School Was james madison a federalist or anti-federalist? True enough, his nationalism assumed, as he put it in his letter to Washington, a “middle ground” that did not call for the abolition of the state governments. 45, 313--14. Indeed, why he chose to direct his argument only against nullification by a single state is baffling since the same consequences would flow in rough proportion as the states are less than unanimous in nullifying a particular national law. In other words, the evidence is scanty, to say the least. But, save for very obvious and flagrant cases—and these, in the nature of the case, would usually involve state encroachment on national authority—it is difficult to discern any such rules. This is understandable. Even before the Constitutional Convention we can see a manifest “tension” in our official documents concerning the nature of the political relationship of the states to one another. Indeed, as we have already noted, he believed the common constituents would have a distinct propensity to favor the states over the national government should there be any conflict. First, he sets forth in Federalist 10 and in the latter part of Federalist 51 the virtues of the proposed extended or large republic: “In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of the majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good” (269). It seems that Madison, along with many other Federalists, embraced a long-term commitment to a balance of power between the two levels of government, but altered his specific stance depending on which level he considered to be too powerful at the time. To the extent that the procedure requires the concurrence of an extra-majority of the states, “it departs from the national and advances towards the federal character.” However, to the degree the process does not require unanimity among the states, “it loses again the federal and partakes of the national character” (39:198). The Federalist Papers Page 1 of 334 The Federalist Papers The Federalist Papers are a series of 85 essays written by Alexander Hamilton (51), John Jay (5), and James Madison (29) between October 1787 and August 1788. However, with his position on the incorporation of a national bank on constitutional grounds in 1791, we come to the second phase of his career. New York: John Tiebout, 1799. We need only recall here his position in Federalist 46, namely that the jurisdictional lines “will not depend merely on the comparative ambition or address of the different governments.” Rather, he holds, “the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone. For a dissenting view see Lance Banning, “The Hamiltonian Madison,” The Virginia Magazine 92 (January 1984). [79 ]Here we are speaking of a “consensus” not unlike that which he perceived for the support of domestic manufactures and the incorporation of a national bank. Federalist Papers No. And, even if it is true, as Meyers contends, that Madison was playing the role of “working statesman” —a role that would warrant his picking and choosing sides as the circumstances dictated—we still must face the question whether he did so by applying consistent rules and principles that can be communicated to future leaders who might like to play this same role. For example, Madison held out little prospect for just, stable, and republican government in Rhode Island outside the confines of union: “the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits,” he writes, “would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it” (51:269). Can the states, in other words, really possess “inviolable” portions of sovereignty without depriving the nation of its capacity for self-preservation? If so, what caused this change of perception? In his view, Madison stood between the strong nationalists and the states’ rights partisans by “constantly seeking moderation and often opposing what he took to be the dangerous, dominant teaching of the time.” Peter Schotten, “Joseph Story,” American Political Thought, ed. But this interpretation seems most unlikely, because it is an open invitation to frequent debate about fundamental constituent principles, a debate that could only undermine public confidence in the Constitution. Quite the contrary. The most important of these would seem to be those that hold out the prospect of insuring a stable consensus—a consensus that differs from others that emerge from our political processes because a wider and more fundamental complex of considerations and values must necessarily come into play. In addition to this, as we might gather from these explanations, we can expect to encounter difficulties in formulating easily transmissible rules or principles from Madison’s approach in determining the proper state-national boundaries. Suppose, for instance, that Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland had declared the national bank unconstitutional on the same grounds originally advanced by Representative Madison. The essays were published anonymously, under the pen name "Publius," … [11 ]Ibid., 127. To this we may add another consideration not at all alien to Madison’s more general views: reliance on the Court could well produce an inflexibility that might seriously impair the national government in meeting its constitutional obligations; or, if not that, the flouting of the Court’s decisions by the political arms would, on any showing, undermine popular confidence in the system. The Essential James Madison www.thefederalistpapers.org Page 2 JAMES MADISON QUOTES A watchful eye must be kept on ourselves lest while we are building ideal monuments of Renown and Bliss here we neglect to have our names enrolled in the Annals of Heaven. Writings, V, 23. The political situation exacerbated a post-war economic recession, and the federal Congress found itself unable to pay the interest on its debts or secure any further loans. Nevertheless, as we will also make clear, there is no gainsaying the “other” position that forms the theoretical framework for understanding the perplexing problems that he confronted throughout his second phase. Or do we make this determination, as Madison seems to suggest, on an estimate of the possibilities of “a change in the public opinion”? But looking at the phrase from this perspective is not without enormous drawbacks. From our vantage point this is hardly a “minor” inconsistency. In his estimation “whatever may be the latitude of Jurisdiction assumed by the Judicial Power of the U.S. it is less formidable to the reserved sovereignty of the States than the latitude of power which it has assigned to the National Legislature.” 81 But he was not at a loss about what to do if the Court did play such a role: “Such is the plastic faculty of legislation, that notwithstanding the firm tenure which judges have on their offices, they can by various regulations be kept or reduced within the paths of duty; more especially with the aid of their amenability to the Legislative tribunal in the form of impeachment.” Moreover, as we have pointed out, he thought it unlikely that the Court “would long be indulged in a career of usurpation to the decided opinions and policy of the Legislature.” 82. James Madison, 1816. George C. S. Benson (Claremont, California: The Institute for Studies in Federalism, 1962). James Madison Jr. (March 16, 1751 – June 28, 1836) was an American statesman, diplomat, expansionist, philosopher, and Founding Father who served as the fourth president of the United States from 1809 to 1817. What we see from the foregoing is that there are two aspects or dimensions of Madison’s position regarding the role of the Court: one that deals with its role relative to the states; the other that concerns its authority relative to the other branches of the national government, principally Congress. [26 ]Gaillard Hunt, The Life of James Madison (New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1902), 211. Federalist No. But, the role he suggests for national institutions—i.e., the Congress and the Supreme Court—as potential referees is not free from theoretical difficulties, since they can also be considered parties to the disputes or controversies they are called upon to settle. 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